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Abstract:  The paper compares the indirect tax structures and consumption patterns of three
European countries (the UK, Greece and Hungary) and studies the likely distributional impact of
a potential convergence of their indirect tax systems by exploiting the rich source of Family
Expenditure Survey microdata of these countries. The results reveal a southern/northern
distinction in expenditure patterns, while, in terms of tax systems and inequality, the common
history of a market economy within the European Union shared by the UK and Greece proves to
be a strong determinant of common structures. Over the last decade indirect tax structures among
the three countries converged, at the same time loosing part of their redistributive power. Indirect
tax harmonisation towards a simple system of, for example, the UK type might reduce inequality.
I INTRODUCTION
T
he process of increased economic integration in Europe has serious fiscal
implications. A major policy concern has been that this process, through
enhancing the mobility of commodities, capital and people, broadens the scope
for externalities or spillover effects and tax-induced distortions in the
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are the sole responsibility of the author.allocation of resources. As far as indirect taxation is concerned, inter-country
differences in commodity taxation may lead to cross-country differences in
consumer marginal rates of substitution or in producer marginal rates of
transformation, depending on whether the destination or origin principle of
taxation is applied (De Bonis, 1999). Consequently, the destination principle
implies inefficiency in global consumption and creates an incentive for
consumers for cross-boarder shopping either through physical movement or
just taking advantage of increased technological possibilities. The origin
principle implies inefficiency in global production and creates an incentive for
producers for moving production facilities. Tax harmonisation can be
perceived as a way of avoiding both distortions irrespective of the taxation
principle adopted. This is an important aspect of the theoretical rationale
explaining the efforts of the European Commission towards some degree of
indirect tax co-ordination among member-states.1
Any move towards such co-ordination might have serious distributional
consequences. A large part of the relevant literature focuses on multilateral
tax reform and the welfare effects of indirect tax harmonisation policies or the
potential superiority of co-operative versus non-cooperative tax settings in a
more game-theoretic approach (Keen, 1987, 1989; Turunen-Red and
Woodland, 1990; Kanbur and Keen, 1993; Lopez-Garcia, 1998; Cremer and
Gahvari, 2000, Keen et al., 2002). These contributions use models which
inevitably take a very simplistic view of each national economy and its indirect
tax structure, while any distributional implications of harmonisation are
sidestepped. 
More precisely, although some of the studies on indirect tax harmonisation
explicitly recognise the need to take into account differences in the pattern of
individual preferences and the acceptability or feasibility of various taxes
when considering any proposal for tax rate convergence (see Smith, 1993 or
Cnossen, 1990), there has been very little comparative work done on, for
example, consumption patterns, indirect tax structures and their rationale
among two or more EU member states. The purpose of this paper is to explore
whether any valuable insights can be gained from such comparisons. More
precisely, it explores the likely distributional effect of indirect tax
harmonisation by means of comparing the spending patterns and existing
indirect tax systems among countries whose indirect tax systems seek to be
harmonised.
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1 Within a framework of common monetary policy, demand management and stabilisation policies
are to a large extent carried out by fiscal policy. This enhances the role of taxation as an automatic
stabiliser and might be an additional concern in the design of the indirect tax structure (HM
Treasury, 2003).The United Kingdom, Greece and Hungary provide the choice of
comparison. The UK and Greece are obvious choices, since they are both
market economies – with the latter being a much more distorted economy –
and also share similar economic and political influences and a common history
within the European Union, while at the same time differing in size and level
of economic development, the latter considered an important determinant of
tax structures (Tanzi, 1987). Hungary, a former socialist economy in
transition, is a less obvious, but nevertheless interesting choice. It has the
same size and comparable level of economic development as Greece. However,
economic development in Hungary arose from a completely different
organisation of the economy and the society and different social processes for
co-ordinating production and distribution decisions than either the UK or
Greece. Furthermore, Hungary since the end of the 1980s has realised a
radical restructuring of its economy and reoriantation of its fiscal and
monetary priorities, such that it now qualifies as a member of the enlarged
European Union.
The techniques employed in the paper lie within the framework of
microsimulation modelling and are based on the same utilitarian welfare
economics on which the theory of optimal taxation rests, though we use them
to draw comparisons between countries and assess the likely distributional
impact of a convergence of their indirect tax structures, rather than criticise
the observed tax structure for its departure from optimality. 
Section II provides an overview of the indirect tax system of Greece, the
UK and Hungary and sets it in a macroeconomic framework in an attempt to
understand its broad features and role in relation to other parts of the
government budget. The methodological framework, within which the indirect
tax systems of the three countries are compared and evaluated, combines tools
from the theory on optimal taxation and microsimulation modelling
techniques. This, along with the microdata sources used are analysed in
Section III. The same section also provides a description of the key factors that
would underpin the likely redistributive effect of indirect tax harmonisation.
Section IV compares each of the countries along the dimensions identified
above, with a view to examining the likely distributional effects of tax
harmonisation. Section V concludes. 
II INDIRECT TAXATION IN UK, GREECE AND HUNGARY: 
AN OVERVIEW
Any attempt to compare and explain how the taxation of different
commodity groups is addressed in countries with distinct political, social and
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placed in a broader macroeconomic perspective. After all it is the
macroeconomic conditions, the historical background and the beliefs of the
government and the people about what constitutes an acceptable approach to
indirect taxation that will determine the structure of the indirect tax system
and the role that it has been assigned to perform.2 Most of the above
dimensions were indeed dissimilar in Greece, the UK and Hungary and, thus,
led to quite diverse perceptions about the desired design of indirect taxation
and the way in which indirect taxation resulted to operate in each of these
countries.
We  start by looking at Greece. As noted by Alogoskoufis (1995), Greek
economic performance was one of the most impressive in post-war Europe. The
big change was observed after the second oil crisis in 1979, when Greece
started to diverge from the other OECD countries and “becomes
unambiguously the worst performer in the OECD” (Giavazzi, 1995). The post
oil-crisis period found Greece governed by the Socialist party, which only six
years after the re-democratisation of the political regime was faced with
strong demands for the promotion of equity, nationalisation and income
redistribution. Increasing real incomes (through both wage and government
transfer increases) was given high priority as a response to the previous
suppression of the freedom of labour and the low-wage policies followed during
the whole post-war period and also as a step towards the institutionalisation
of a minimal welfare state in Greece. Although the increase in public
expenditure, which was inevitable considering the accumulated social
demands and the evident under-development of social services, was
supplemented by the promotion of supply-side policies (which in practice
proved inefficient), the results were not favourable for the prospects of the
economy’s growth.
In a climate of increasing debts and the need for fiscal consolidation, tax
revenue collection was considered of key importance. The need for healthy
public finances was further reinforced by the imposition of the Maastricht
criteria and the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact. As a result,
Greece witnessed a substantial rise in the level of taxation with the tax/GDP
ratio increasing from less than 30 per cent to converge to the European Union
average of more than 40 per cent between 1980 and 2000. A major feature of
the Greek tax system is its reliance on indirect taxes, which have occupied a
central position for over a century as the primary source of government
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2 See Tanzi (1987) and Burgess and Stern (1993) on the relationship between the structure of the
tax system and the level of economic development.revenue.3 The relative shares of direct and indirect taxes in total tax revenue
are exactly the reverse of the European Union averages of around 60 per cent
and 40 per cent respectively. The share of indirect taxes to GDP in Greece is
among the highest in OECD and EU countries (see, OECD, 2001). 
In 1987 Greece introduced VAT, as a result of its accession to the
European Community. In 1988, VAT was levied at four rates: 3 per cent, 6 per
cent, 16 per cent and 36 per cent. The very low 3 per cent rate covered cultural
items (books, newspapers, magazines and theatres). The low 6 per cent rate
covered most food items, heating oil, medicines, transport services, etc. The
high (36 per cent) rate applied to luxury items or products creating negative
externalities, like spirits, tobacco, television sets, motor fuel. The standard (16
per cent) rate applied to the remaining goods and services. Several items, like
educational, medical and financial services, were and still are exempt from
VAT. Since 1988, the two low and the standard VAT rates have been increased
to 4 per cent, 8 per cent and 18 per cent respectively, while the top VAT rate
has been abolished. Excises are levied on all the traditional candidates for
such taxation, namely tobacco, petroleum products, alcoholic beverages and
beer. Several additional taxes are levied on car purchase and use, all of which
are highly differentiated by engine power and/or car technology. A variety of
other taxes (like stamp duties) still apply at varying rates to a large number
of products or transactions thus complicating the tax system, though their
importance in revenue terms has decreased over time.
The UK has been a much purer market economy than Greece. Its economy
is much larger in size, its path to industrialisation was hardly interrupted
(with the exception of the world wars) and it enjoyed much higher levels of
economic development and per capita GNP. The UK economy is based
primarily on industry and services, while both Hungary and especially Greece
are more agricultural economies. On the taxation front, since the 1960s the
overall tax burden has increased, with the relative significance of direct versus
indirect taxes increasing until the mid-1970s and falling since then, while
social security contributions have been steadily increasing throughout (see
Kay and King, 1990, also Lee and Pashardes, 1988). Although the role of
indirect taxation was enhanced in the UK during the 1980s under the
influence of the conservative government, indirect taxes represent a much
lower percentage in total tax revenue compared to Greece (see OECD, 1999).
Despite the fact that the major redistributional role in the UK is performed
through the expenditure side of the budget, the structure of indirect taxation,
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3Alongside historical reasons one should also explain the high reliance of governments on indirect
taxation in terms of lack of ability or even political will to curb tax evasion in other parts of the
tax system. Indicative is the co-existence of high statutory tax rates and low tax revenue yields in
comparison to other EU countries.albeit very simple, does reflect some broad distributional considerations. VAT
is levied at a rate of 17.5 per cent (stable since 1991), with certain
distributionally sensitive goods (like food, books, children’s clothing,
medicines) being zero-rated. In 1994-95, a reduced rate was introduced for
domestic fuel and power, originally 8 per cent, but now 5 per cent. Similarly to
Greece, several services (like health, education, financial and insurance
services) are VAT exempt. Excise duties are levied on tobacco, fuel, wine, beer
and spirits, with tobacco and fuel excises steadily rising over time and excises
on alcohol remaining stable or slightly falling since 1991. An annual car
licence fee is also levied at varying rates according to car technology.4
The Hungarian economy differs from both the UK and Greece in several
key aspects. Although it has the same population size and a comparable level
of economic development to Greece (GDP per capita in Hungary taking
account of differences in the purchasing power of the local currencies in 1991
and also in 2001 was around a quarter lower than in Greece), its historical
legacy in terms of political and economic structure is radically different. Under
socialist principles of political and economic organisation, production and
distribution decision making was highly concentrated. 
Unlike other socialist economies, in Hungary, especially after the 1968
reforms, the government was attempting to guide decisions at the enterprise
level by taxes and subsidies rather than direct control. Thus, the tax and
transfer system entailed high levels of both taxes and subsidies to enterprises.
At the same time, taxes on personal income had a minor role, while indirect
taxes and price subsidies were designed to play a major role in redistributing
income and purchasing power – though sometimes in a distributionally
undesirable way, for example in the case of housing subsidies (see Newbery,
1993 and Pudney, 1995).
The political and economic reforms of the last two years of the 1980s
happened after a period of sluggish economic performance and a steadily
worsening foreign debt. The accompanying tax reforms involved the
introduction on 1 January 1988 of the Value Added Tax and a Personal Income
Tax (PIT), followed a year later by an Enterprise Profit Tax (EPT) in a move
towards a Western type of tax system (for an analysis of the Hungarian tax
reform see Newbery, 1991). The effects of the reform were a dramatic fall in
tax revenue from enterprises, as real GDP declined and so did the share of
profits in GDP as well as the rate of direct tax on profits. At the same time the
move to a market economy with numerous smaller firms had as a natural
consequence the loss of information and reduced tax efficiency and tax
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4 For a detailed description of the indirect tax system in the UK, see Adam and Shaw (2003).coverage.5 Reduced tax efficiency characterised also the PIT system, though
revenues from this source increased dramatically in recent years. 
As far as indirect taxes are concerned, the VAT replaced a variety of
turnover taxes leading to a more simplified tax stucture. The standard VAT
rate was initially set and still is 25 per cent, with transactions relating to
financial services, health care services, insurance and education being exempt.
Initially, several distributionally sensitive items (including most foodstuffs,
books, medicines, household fuel and power and a wide range of services) were
zero-rated. By 1993-94 VAT rates stabilised, when VAT was extended to food,
household fuel and power and other services, albeit at a lower rate of 12 per
cent. Thus, currently the only zero-rated items are text books, specified
medicines and medical materials and supplies. The initial reform kept excises
on tobacco, alcohol and motor fuel, as well as subsidies on household fuels,
district heating, medicine, public transport and some foodstuffs, though some
of the latter were gradually eliminated over the next few years. 
Despite the radical reform towards a market economy, the increase in
after-tax income inequality has not been sharp (Kattuman and Redmond,
1997) mainly as a result of sustained social expenditures and remaining
distributional considerations in the reformed indirect tax system. However
undesirable, these policies will be hard to sustain in the future, since economic
reforms were driven by considerations of efficiency at the expense of equity.
Kornai (1992), for example, argues that the budget will be put under increased
pressure as revenues will fall with the growth of the private sector leading to
greater tax evasion and avoidance; it is hardly desirable to curb the private
sector, which is intended to drive economic growth in the country. At the same
time, falling GDP and private and public consumption are leading to a
narrowing of the tax base (OECD, 1991), while increased market inequalities
increase the need for provision of a safety net for the disadvantaged. It
becomes evident that budgetary pressures, though driven by different sources,
are comparable in both Greece and Hungary and so is the need for increased
tax revenues. 
III METHODOLOGY AND DATA
The methodological approach adopted uses microsimulation modelling, a
recent but increasingly used tool in policy analysis.6 Microsimulation
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5 For a theoretical analysis of a tax system during reform see Newbery (1997).
6 For a recent review of articles on microsimulation modelling, see Mitton et al (2000). For
applications on indirect taxation, see Redmond et al. (1996); Davies et al. (1987); Baker et al.
(1990) and Decoster et al. (1996).modelling, introduced by Nicholson (1964) in the UK and Pechman and Okner
(1974) in the US, arose as an alternative to the common practice in policy
making of basing redistributional reforms on the analysis of a few
hypothetical households meant to be representative of the population.
Microsimulation models are instead computer programs that simulate the
total national population of individuals or households using a micro-data
sample of such units. The sample is representative of the national population
in the sense that it includes both the whole range of real households and in the
correct proportions.
The merits of such an approach are well established. The information
available in the microdata sets regarding spending patterns, income sources,
demographic, employment, location and a range of other household
characteristics, allows detailed simulations of public policies. Specifically as
regards indirect taxation, expenditure data are available at a household
and/or individual level for a few hundred expenditure groups, so that even
complicated indirect tax structures (like the Greek one) can be modelled in
detail. Furthermore, such models retain the full range of individual
characteristics at every analytical stage, thus taking full account of the
variation between individuals and providing improved qualitative and
quantitative information for evaluating tax structures. On the other hand,
this approach is not free of limitations, especially as regards its static and
“closed” view of the economic system. The distribution of the indirect tax
burden, for example, is analysed on an annual rather than lifetime basis and
there are reasons to suspect that this might make a difference (see Poterba,
1989, Slemrod, 1992 and Davies et al., 1984). However, the static nature of the
microsimulation approach would be more limiting for policy options concerned
with intertemporal transfers, for example pension systems, rather than
indirect taxes.
The primary data sources are the Greek 1988 Family Expenditure Survey
(FES) microdata set conducted by the National Statistical Service of Greece,
the UK 1991 FES microdata set (Great Britain Department of Employment,
1992) and the Hungarian 1991 Household Budget Survey microdata set
(Hungarian Central Statistical Office, 1993). Abrief description of the surveys,
their quality and their degree of comparability is provided in Kaplanoglou
(1999).7 The surveys in all three countries record household expenditure on a
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7 These surveys, though not the most recent, are comparable across the three countries since they
were conducted broadly during the same period. In any case, consumption patterns do not
drastically change within a short period of time. For example, expenditure data from the most
recent Greek HES conducted in 1999 are remarkably similar to the older data used in the paper.
Correlation coefficients between the old and the most recent distributional characteristics (for a
definition, see later) attain values of around 0.95.rather detailed set of commodities (e.g. around 300 commodity groups in the
Greek Household Expenditure Survey). This expenditure includes any indirect
taxes levied on the commodities. Information on the tax rates applying to each
commodity group has been collected and tax payments have been calculated at
a household level.8 We assume that indirect taxes are fully shifted to consumer
prices, and we ignore indirect taxes on intermediate goods that are not
rebated. These are standard assumptions for this kind of study (Symons and
Walker, 1988, Redmond, 1995, Newbery and Révész, 2000). For purposes of
comparability, commodities have been grouped into eighty-seven categories. 
Since, as explained in the introduction, the present approach lies within
the tradition of normative optimal taxation theory, the distributional impact
of the different indirect tax structures is evaluated and compared within the
utilitarian framework by means of a social welfare function, i.e., focusing on
the sum of individual utilities, which is maximised subject to a government
revenue constraint by choosing the optimal values for certain policy variables
(i.e. tax rates) – see Samuelson (1986). More specifically, the redistributive
effects of indirect taxes are evaluated at a very disaggregated level through
the calculation of the “distributional characteristics” of commodities. The
notion of the distributional characteristic of a good was introduced by
Feldstein (1972) as a convenient concept for introducing considerations of
distributional equity in the analysis of optimal prices and taxes. Feldstein
used this concept in the framework of optimal pricing of public enterprise
products. Since then, the concept of distributional characteristics with
variations (see Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980) has been introduced in the theory
of optimal commodity taxation. It has been the main source of modification of
the Ramsey rules on optimal commodity taxation (Ramsey, 1927) by explicitly
bringing about the inherent conflict between equity and efficiency
considerations regarding the optimal structure of indirect taxes.
The distributional characteristic of a commodity, di, measures how
concentrated consumption of the commodity is on the “socially deserving” and
is defined as:
Σ β h qixih
h di = ––––––––– (1)
qiXi
where  qixih  is the expenditure of agent h on good i,  qiXi is aggregate
expenditure on good i and β h is the social marginal utility of transferring one
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8 For a description of the indirect tax system and the mechanics of its incorporation in the
database, see Redmond (1995) for the UK, Kaplanoglou (2000) for Greece and Newbery and
Révész (2000) for Hungary.euro to agent h, formally defined as:
∂W   ∂Vh
βh   –––   ––– (2)
∂Vh     ∂g
where W(V1,…,Vh,…VH) is a Utilitarian social welfare function, agent h enjoys
utility Vh = Vh(mh+g, q) that depends on income before transfers, mh, uniform
lump-sum government transfers, g, and a vector of consumer prices, q.9 In this
sense, the “socially deserving” are those with high social marginal values of
consumption, βh. We further normalise di by the average of βhover agents:
Σ β h qixih




This is a useful normalisation since β h/β
–
gives a measure independent of
units. Furthermore, now the distributional characteristic has the intuitive
interpretation of measuring the relative benefit of giving a subsidy to
commodity i (sum of β h’s weighted by the consumption of good i) relative to the
benefit of giving a lump-sum subsidy to everyone (average β
–
). Note that the
distributional characteristics of goods will only be irrelevant if they are the
same for all goods, something that would happen if β h is the same for all
households (no aversion to inequality) or if the relative quantity of goods
purchased is the same for all households. In practice in most cases none of
these assumptions holds. The conventional welfare assumption that β h
declines as income (or consumption) rises implies that the value of di will be
higher, the lower the income elasticity of demand for good i is – i.e. di will be
higher for a necessity than for a luxury.
To make this approach operational, one needs to know the expenditure on
goods by different households (this information is readily available from the
Family Expenditure Survey data) and also a method of calculating the welfare
weights β h. The β h may be specified in a number of ways. The approach used
here is adapted from Atkinson (1970) and has been used in several empirical
studies (for example, Newbery, 1995). Social welfare is represented by an
additive utilitarian social welfare function, W = Σuh, where h indexes agents
and  uh is the isoelastic utility function defined over real consumption
(expenditure) per equivalent adult (ch), or formally: 
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9 In the empirical part, differences in household size and composition are accounted for using the
OECD equivalence scale, which counts the first adult in the household as 1, additional adults as
0.7 and children under 14 as 0.5. In this respect, an agent is defined as one equivalent adult, who
is assumed to receive the total household expenditure divided by the number of equivalent adults.(ch)1-ε
–––––––        for ε   1
1 – ε
uh= (4)
log (ch)    for ε = 1
Under the specific parameterisation of W and uh we have:
∂W    ∂uh
βh =  –––   ––– = 1. u'(ch) = (ch)–ε (5)
∂Vh     ∂g
The parameter ε is an indicator of aversion to inequality. A value of 0
indicates no inequality aversion and βh is the same for all households; a value
of 1 indicates that transferring 1 euro to someone of double the living standard
of another has a social value of half that of the reference individual. A value of
5 and over approaches the Rawlsian “maxi-min” principle (for ε = 5 a marginal
unit of income to the poorest is worth 32 times the value of a unit to someone
with twice that income).
We  now discuss how one could utilise the information on consumption
patterns and existing tax structures in the three countries to study the likely
distributional impact of a move towards harmonisation of their indirect tax
structures. Within the above framework of analysis this could be done in three
ways. The first way is to explore the extent to which distributionally sensitive
goods are the same across the three countries. Similar consumption patterns
would probably facilitate the adoption of reforms towards indirect tax
harmonisation which reduce inequality. In comparing consumption patterns,
an important role should also be attached to the extent of existing overall
inequality of consumption. 
The second way is to assess the degree of similarity of the indirect tax
systems already applied in the three countries. Obviously, if the indirect tax
structures in two countries are very dissimilar, as is rather the case between
Hungarian and Greek or UK indirect taxes, then one might expect the
distributional effect exerted by a move towards harmonisation of tax rates to
be stronger.
The third way, which is partly related to the second, is to study the extent
to which current indirect taxes are imposed on distributionally sensitive goods
in each country and furthermore, to examine whether alternative tax systems
would be better targeted in distributional terms. For example, the 1991
Hungarian indirect tax system which still rather strongly reflected
distributional concerns would most probably lose part of its redistributive
HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION PATTERNS: A THREE COUNTRY PERSPECTIVE 93power if replaced by a western-type tax regime. The three key factors
described above are analysed in the following section.
IV INDIRECT TAX HARMONISATION: A DISTRIBUTIONAL APPROACH
We  begin by comparing consumption patterns in the three counties,
assessing the extent to which distributional characteristics of commodities are
similar across the three countries and the extent to which similarities and
dissimilarities in distributional characteristics can be attributed to differences
in consumer preferences and underlying overall expenditure inequality. The
broad spending patterns of UK, Greek and Hungarian households primarily
reflect the underlying level of economic development of each country (Figure
1). Necessities like food, fuel and lighting occupy a distinctively higher share
of the household budget in Hungary, while households in the much more
developed UK economy spend considerably more in relative terms on
household durables, transport and recreational goods and services. The budget
shares of other commodity groups seem to be determined by consumer
preferences, prices or demographics. For example, alcohol consumption is far
more important in Hungary and the UK, which is probably to be explained by
consumer preferences since the price of alcohol is lower in Greece and
demographics are unlikely to play a role.
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UK share GR share HUN shareTurning to the more disaggregated level, Figure 2 gives the graph of
distributional characteristics of Greece, the UK and Hungary for the value of
inequality aversion of 1. Distributional characteristics of commodities in each
country have been ranked by decreasing order and then plotted against the
cumulative budget share of the same goods. Thus, commodities with high
distributional characteristics (i.e. distributionally sensitive goods) lie on the
left side of the graph, while commodities with low distributional character-
istics lie on the right. Since the ranking of distributional characteristics of
commodities differs among the three countries, there is no direct
correspondence of commodities among the three countries in terms of their
location in the cumulative budget shares. Nevertheless, Figure 2 shows clearly
that commodities are considerably more equally distributed across individuals
in the former socialist economy of Hungary, than in the two market economies
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UK 1991 Greece 1988 Hungary 1991of Greece and the UK. In the case of Hungary, there is rather little variation
in the distributional characteristics for 80 per cent of expenditure, as their
values decrease from about 1 to 0.8. The respective lines for Greece and the
UK follow a much steeper pattern, for 80 per cent of the expenditure the
values of the distributional characteristics decrease from about 1 to about 0.6.
Note that although distributional characteristics are ranked for each country
so that the position of specific commodities is different, the overall shape of the
distribution is remarkably similar between Greece and the UK.
Similar information is conveyed by Figures 3-5, which give the graphs of
distributional characteristics for pairs of countries. In Figure 3, the distribu-
tional characteristics of the UK for the three values of ε (0.5, 1 and 2) are again
plotted against cumulative expenditure shares corresponding to the ranking
when  ε  = 1; this time the crosses show the values of the distributional
characteristics for the same commodity for Hungary, located by its position in
the cumulative UK expenditure share. Figures 4 and 5 have been constructed
in a similar way for the other two pairs of countries (Greece-UK, Hungary-
Greece).
The distributional characteristics for Hungary have higher values for
almost the entire set of commodities compared to the Greek (see Figure 5) and
the UK ones (see Figure 3), while the UK distributional characteristics follow
closer to their Greek counterparts (see Figure 4). More detailed analysis would
reveal that basic foodstuffs (for example, flour, bread, meat, vegetables and
fruit) rank consistently high in all countries despite the striking differences in
the ranking of several individual food items, which are driven by climatic
differences, as well as differences in the production patterns of the countries.
Items for which Greece is a heavy producer (for example, olive oil, vegetables,
fruit, wine) are much more distributionally sensitive in Greece than either the
UK or Hungary, while the opposite is true for items like processed meat, butter
or margarine. Purchase of durables and especially cars ranks low in all three
countries.
The patterns of the distributions in Figure 2 can be explained either in
terms of the underlying expenditure elasticities of commodities and/or in
terms of the underlying inequality in the expenditure distribution. To see the
effect of the latter, several inequality measures have been employed and
presented in Table 1,10 that is the well-known Gini index (Gini, 1912), the
Atkinson indices for values of inequality aversion ε of 0.5, 1 and 2 (Atkinson,
1970), and the two Theil indices, T and N (Theil, 1967, also Shorrocks, 1980).
96 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
10 All measures refer to the distribution of aggregate total expenditure per equivalent adult using
the OECD equivalence scale for all three surveys. Regarding the sensitivity of results with respect
to the choice of equivalence scale, the replacement of the OECD equivalence scale with the
McClements one does not change the results in any significant way.Clearly, by all inequality measures Hungary is a remarkably more
egalitarian society than either the UK or Greece. All measures of inequality
have considerably lower values in Hungary than in the two market economies,
despite the fact that significant economic reforms towards a market economy
were already under way in Hungary.11
What the comparison of the expenditure inequality levels suggests is that
while the difference in the distributions of Figure 2 between the UK and
Hungary (or Greece and Hungary) can be to a large extent accounted for by the
remarkably higher expenditure inequality in the UK and Greece, any
differences in distributional characteristics between Greece and the UK have
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Figure 3: UK and Hungarian Distributional Characteristics 
11 Lorenz curves were also constructed for the three countries, indicating a clear dominance of
Hungary over Greece and the UK. The Greek Lorenz curve dominated the UK one though not by
much. A recent OECD study reveals that inequality levels have not significantly changed in
Greece and Hungary between the end of the 1980s and mid-1990s, while in the UK inequality




































02 04 06 08 0 100
Cumulative budget share
UK (e = 0.5)
UK (e = 2)
UK (e = 1)
Hungary (e = 1)98 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
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Greece (e = 1)to be attributed to differences in expenditure elasticities and tastes, since
inequality of expenditure is at incredibly similar levels for both countries. This
suggests that if one abstracts from differences in overall inequality, commodity
structures at least as captured by distributional characteristics are more
similar between the two northern countries, suggesting that it might be easier
to find directions of indirect tax harmonisation which reduce inequality in
these two countries. 
Turning to the analysis of the indirect tax systems, the average indirect
tax burden is the highest in Greece ( 14 per cent), followed by the UK ( 11
per cent) and Hungary ( 8 per cent).12 Out of 87 commodity groups, Table 2
presents the ten commodity groups with the highest tax shares, i.e. the most
important tax bases. Despite differences in indirect tax rates, consumer
preferences, expenditure patterns and policy priorities, there seem to exist
some striking similarities. All three systems are rather concentrated, with
around two-thirds of tax revenue being collected from just ten commodity
groups. Car fuel and tobacco are the two most important tax bases in all three
countries. Car purchase also seems to comprise an important revenue source.
On the other hand, the tax share of alcoholic drinks (beer, wine and spirits) is
among the highest in the UK and Hungary, while this is not the case for
Greece. Overall, the correlation coefficient between tax rates on commodities
in the beginning of the 1990s was 0.64 between Greece and the UK, 0.37
between the UK and Hungary and 0.33 between Greece and Hungary. This is
itself a reflection of the tax harmonisation already having taken place by that
time among EU countries. It is interesting to note that indirect tax reforms
adopted in the three countries, and especially in Hungary, since then, led to a
convergence of indirect tax structures. Thus, in 2003 the correlation coefficient
between tax rates of commodities increased to 0.74 between Greece and the
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Table 1.  Inequality Measures for Consumption: Greece, UK and Hungary.
Greece UK Hungary
Inequality measure FES 1988 FES 1991 HBS 1991
Theil index (c=1) (T)0 . 183 0.198 0.077
Theil index (c=0) (N)0 . 179 0.189 0.075
Gini coefficient 0.326 0.336 0.229
Atkinson ε = 0.5 0.086 0.092 0.042
Atkinson ε = 1.0 0.162 0.171 0.081
Atkinson ε = 2.0 0.300 0.309 0.151
Sources: NSSG (1994), personal communication with D.Newbery (1994), Great Britain
Department of Employment (1992).








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6UK, to 0.68 between the UK and Hungary and to 0.62 between Greece and
Hungary. As will be shown later, the convergence of indirect tax structures had
similar distributional effects in all three countries.
A way of assessing the distributional effect of indirect taxes at a very
disaggregated level and the extent to which indirect taxes in the three
countries are imposed on distributionally sensitive goods is by calculating the
correlation coefficient between tax rates and distributional characteristics of
commodities. A negative value of the coefficient would suggest that
distributionally sensitive commodities attract relatively lower tax rates,
implying that the system is in general targeted towards the “socially
deserving”.13 The correlation coefficients between tax rates and distributional
characteristics weighted by budget shares of commodities are presented in
Table 3. In the beginning of the 1990s, the correlation coefficient is –0.02 for
the UK, –0.18 for Greece and –0.25 for Hungary. On that basis, the Hungarian
indirect tax system appears to be the most successful on distributional
grounds, since even by 1991 Hungary had managed to sustain substantial
subsidies for a number of distributionally sensitive commodities. In Greece,
the indirect tax system also appears to be rather progressive, though to a
considerably lesser extent. However, more extensive analysis demonstrates
that any observed progressivity of indirect taxation in Greece is entirely
attributable to the taxation of cars and can be easily reversed under
straightforward assumptions on charging for road use – for a more thorough
exposition see Kaplanoglou and Newbery (2004). Finally, as explained in
Section II, in the UK indirect taxation is not used as a major tool for
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13 This way of assessing the distributional effect of indirect taxes lies within the theoretical
framework of optimal taxation theory, and thus is not directly related with more traditional
measures of the redistributive effect of taxes (e.g. the percentage change of the Gini index,
Kakwani, 1984). The latter are based on a mathematical analysis of the distribution and the
redistribution of income (Lambert, 1993). Nevertheless, there is empirical evidence suggesting
that the two approaches give similar results (Kaplanoglou and Newbery, 2003).
Table 3: Pearson Correlation Coefficients Between Distributional
Characteristics and Tax Rates in Greece, the UK and Hungary 
Greek UK Hun. Greek UK Hun.
Taxes Taxes Taxes Taxes Taxes Taxes
1988 1991 1991 2003 2003 2003
Greek dist.characteristics (ε = 1.0) –0.18 –0.24 –0.21 –0.02 –0.17 –0.14
UK dist.characteristics (ε = 1.0) – –0.02 –0.15 – 0.02 –0.08
Hungarian dist.characteristics (ε = 1.0) – –0.22 –0.25 – –0.23 –0.18
Commodities have been weighted by their budget share.redistribution, although it does reflect some distributional considerations.
This is confirmed by the virtually zero correlation between tax rates of
commodities and their distributional characteristics.
Table 3 also presents some evidence on the likely redistributive effect of
several indirect tax harmonisation exercises, that is what is the likely
distributional impact of replacing the tax system of one country with that of
another, at least as captured by the correlation between the distributional
characteristics and tax rates of commodities. We do not use the Greek indirect
tax system as a model for the other two countries, because its complexity
disqualifies it as an attractive candidate. Converging to the 1991 UK rates
would benefit Greece (probably as a result of the zero-rating of food and other
distributionally sensitive commodities), but not Hungary, whose tax system
seems to be the best targeted. A move towards the 1991 Hungarian tax
structure, which as indicated in Section II best reflects distributional
concerns, would benefit in distributional terms both Greece and the UK, as the
negative correlation coefficient between distributional characteristics and tax
rates would become stronger.
Carrying out the same exercise with the indirect tax rates currently in
place in the three countries allows several interesting conclusions to be drawn.
Indirect tax reforms since the beginning of the 1990s led to more regressive
tax structures in all three countries, as indicated by the weaker negative
correlation coefficients in Greece and Hungary and the positive correlation
coefficient in the UK. This is more evident in the case of Hungary and Greece.
If tax harmonisation towards the Hungarian tax system currently in place
were to replace the Greek or the UK one, the distributional effect would still
be positive, but not to the same extent as before. Again Greece would benefit
by indirect tax harmonisation either towards the UK or the Hungarian tax
structure. Furthermore, replacing 2003 Hungarian taxes with 2003 UK taxes
is now distributionally beneficial for Hungary. Finally, it is interesting to note
that both in 1991 and now, the UK tax rates exhibit much stronger negative
correlation coefficients with the Greek and Hungarian distributional
characteristics, rather than with the UK ones. This would suggest that the
distributional concerns reflected by the UK indirect tax structure (zero-rating
of food, medicines, etc.) seem to be more effective in the less developed
economies of Greece and Hungary rather than in the UK. 
V CONCLUSIONS
To  briefly conclude, in the case of Greece and Hungary, the common
macroeconomic conditions identified in the beginning do not account for
102 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEWparticular similarities in either the level of inequality of overall consumption
(Hungary appears a much more egalitarian society) or in consumption
patterns (as the correlation of distributional characteristics is quite poor and
difficult to explain in terms of differences in inequality) or in tax rate
structures. In contrast, in terms of tax systems and inequality levels, the
common history of a market economy in the European Union shared by the
UK and Greece proves to be a strong determinant of common structures. As
far as expenditure patterns are concerned, results reveal a southern/northern
distinction, at least if we abstract from differences in overall expenditure
inequality.
Regarding the likely distributional impact of indirect tax harmonisation, a
convergence towards the 1991 Hungarian system would clearly benefit both
Greece and the UK. However, such a system involves several subsidies and
zero-rating of a large number of distributionally sensitive goods, and might
not be sustainable within the EU budgetary framework. Hungary itself since
1991 further reformed its indirect taxes towards western-type models (indirect
tax rates on the 87 commodity groups are now much better correlated among
Greece, the UK and Hungary), with an apparently high distributional cost. 
An important point that arises from the analysis is that even a simple
western-type indirect tax structure, as perhaps best approximated by UK
indirect taxes, with uniform VAT on all goods and services, certain
distributionally sensitive commodities zero-rated and excises on a small
number of goods has a certain distributional advantage over complicated
indirect tax structures like the Greek one (which initially involved four VAT
rates set with distributional criteria in mind) and is not much worse than a
system involving many exemptions, zero-rating and subsidies, like the 1991
Hungarian one. Using the UK tax system as a benchmark has certain
advantages in terms of reasonableness and political relevance as a sustainable
system already in operation in a developed country. Furthermore, such a
system approximates EU proposals of co-ordinating tax systems towards a
simpler two-rate structure rather well. Finally, it can be shown that the UK
indirect tax structure can to a large extent be rationalised in terms of optimal
commodity taxation principles (Kaplanoglou, 1999). 
Liberati (2001) reaches a similar conclusion, when assessing the
distributional impact of simplifying the Italian indirect tax system towards
the European proposal of a two-rate VAT. His results show that reducing the
number of VAT rates, with the reduced VAT rate applying to goods with high
distributional characteristics (like food) may be desirable even in the presence
of distributional concerns. Similarly Creedy (2001) suggests that exemptions
or tax reductions designed to introduce progressivity in fact provide a “blunt
redistributive instrument”. 
HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION PATTERNS: A THREE COUNTRY PERSPECTIVE 103These results show that the likely distributional impact of indirect tax
harmonisation towards a simple system of, for example, the UK type might
not be negative for most EU countries.14 Certainly, such reforms should also
be evaluated in terms of their impact on total tax revenue and the implications
for the provision of public goods, and thus welfare, in those countries. In any
case, any distributional costs have to be balanced against the benefits in terms
of reduced tax administration and compliance costs of a simpler tax structure.
Furthermore, the results relate to the analysis of indirect taxes independently
of other redistributive taxes and transfer payments. Direct taxes and
especially transfer payments offer much more effective redistributive
instruments, though the degree to which these instruments are actually
exploited in each EU country might substantially differ.  Hence, the combined
redistributive effect of all parts of the tax and expenditure sides of the budget
in EU countries needs to be considered in a more comprehensive analysis of
moves towards indirect tax harmonisation. 
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